%& --translate-file=il2-pl
\input 0.sty \input ramka  \q \baselineskip11.7pt   \magnification1200
\hsize14.2cm \vsize20.5cm \nopagenumbers
\vglue-10mm
\advance\hoffset5mm
\def\y{\bsn\hrule\bsn}

\headline={\ifnum\pageno>1 \ifodd\pageno \rightheadline\else
\leftheadline\fi\else\hfil\fi}
\def\rightheadline{\vbox{\line{\hfill
{\Blue{\nit Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Section V}}
\hfill\st\folio}%
\vskip4pt\hrule}}
\def\leftheadline{\vbox{\line{\st\folio \hfil\Blue{{\nit
Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Section V}}
\hfil}\vskip5pt\hrule}}

\cl{\n Witold Marciszewski \ $\u$ \ Wy�sza Szko�a Administracji 
Publicznej im.\ Stanis�awa Staszica \ $\u$ \ Bia�ystok} 
\cl{\n Tranlatorium angielskie \ $\u$ \ 2005/2006 $\u$ Zasady zaliczania 
i tekst oryginalny odcinka V} 
 
\b\hrule\b\bsn
{\sb ZASADY ZALICZANIA.} Na zaliczenie Translatorium zarabiamy znajomo�ci�
angielskiego s�ownictwa filozoficznego w zakresie omawianego tekstu Quine'a
{\k Two Dogmas of Empiricism}.
\m
Odpowiednio do skali ocen 3--4--5, odr�niamy trzy szczeble wrajemniczenia,
czyli poziomy zaawansowania. Poziom najni�szy (na ,,3'') definiujemy jako
b�d�cy poni�ej �redniego, nie wchodz�c tu w szczeg�y.

Na poziom �redni (w okolicach ,,4'') awansujemy dzi�ki wykazaniu si�
znajomo�ci� wybranych s��w z odcinka V (tekst poni�ej) -- wyr�nionych
drukiem pogrubionym. W rozmowie zaliczeniowej u�atwieniem b�dzie obecno��
kontekstu, w kt�rym s�owa te wyst�puj�.

Na szczebel najwy�szy mo�na si� wspi��, si�gaj�c dodatkowo po inny materia�,
kt�rym jest lista ok.\ 140 s��w wybranych z ca�ego artyku�u zestawionych
alfabetycznie, bez u�atwienia w postaci kontekstu. Kto wyka�e znajomo��
przynajmniej 3/4 s��w z tego zbioru, uprzednio za� przejdzie pomy�lnie przez
szczebel �redni, ten otrzyma w indeksie certyfikat w postaci liczby ,,5''.
Wa�niejsza jednak od tego jest nauczenie si� wi�zki wa�nych dla
akademickiej angielszczyzny termin�w, do czego sposobo�ci� jest obecne
zadanie. 

\b\m
\cl{\q V. THE VERIFICATION THEORY AND REDUCTIONISM}
\b
1. {\q In the course of these somber reflections we have taken a dim view
first of the {\sb notion} of meaning, then of the notion of {\sb cognitive
synonymy}: and finally of the notion of {\sb analyticity.}
But what, it may be asked, of the {\sb verification theory of meaning}?
This phrase has established itself so firmly as a catchword of empiricism
that we should be very unscientific indeed not to look beneath it for a
possible key to the problem of meaning and the associated problems.}

\m
2. The verification theory of meaning, which has been conspicuous in the
literature from Peirce onward, is that the meaning of a {\sb statement} is
the method of empirically confirming or infirming it. An analytic statement
is that limiting case which is confirmed no matter what.

\m
3. {\q  As urged in Section I, we can as well pass over the question of
meanings as {\sb entities} and move straight to {\sb sameness of meaning},
or {\sb synonymy}. Then what the verification theory says is that statements
are synonymous if and only if they are alike in point of method of {\sb
empirical confirmation} or {\sb infirmation}.}

\m
4. {\q  This is an {\sb account} of cognitive synonymy not of {\sb linguistic
forms} generally, but of statements. However, from the concept of synonymy
of statements we could derive the concept of synonymy for other linguistic
forms, by considerations somewhat similar to those at the end of Section
III. Assuming the notion of "word," indeed, we could explain any two forms
as synonymous when the putting of the one form for an {\sb occurrence} of
the other in any statement (apart from occurrences within "words") yields a
synonymous statement. Finally, given the concept of synonymy thus for
linguistic forms generally, we could define analyticity in terms of synonymy
and {\sb logical truth} as in Section I. For that matter, we could define
analyticity more simply {\sb in terms of} just synonymy of statements together
with logical truth; it is not necessary {\sb to appeal} to synonymy of
linguistic forms other than statements. For a statement may be described as
analytic simply when it is synonymous with a logically true statement.}

\m
5. {\q So, if the verification theory can be {\sb accepted} as an {\sb
adequate account} of statement synonymy, the notion of analyticity is {\sb
saved} after all. However, let us reflect. Statement synonymy is said to be
likeness of method of empirical confirmation or infirmation. Just what are
these methods which are to be compared for likeness? What, in other words,
is the nature of the {\sb relationship} between a statement and the {\sb
experiences} which {\sb contribute} to or detract from its confirmation?}

\m
6. {\q  The most naive view of the relationship is that it is one of direct
report. This is radical reductionism. Every meaningful statement {\sb is 
held to be translatable} into a statement (true or false) about {\sb
immediate} experience. Radical reductionism, in one form or another, well
antedates the verification theory of meaning {\sb explicitly} so called.
Thus Locke and Hume {\sb held} that every {\sb idea} must either originate
{\sb directly} in {\sb sense experience} or else be {\sb compounded} of
ideas {\sb thus originating}; and taking a {\sb hint} from Tooke we might
rephrase this {\sb doctrine} in semantical jargon by saying that a term, to
be {\sb significant} at all, must be either a name of a {\sb sense datum} or
a {\sb compound} of such names or an {\sb abbreviation} of such a compound.
So stated, the doctrine remains {\sb ambiguous} as between sense data as
{\sb sensory events} and sense data as {\sb sensory qualities}; and it
remains {\sb vague} as to the {\sb admissible ways} of compounding.
Moreover, the doctrine is unnecessarily and intolerably {\sb restrictive} in
the {\sb term-by-term} critique which it {\sb imposes}. More {\sb
reasonably}, and {\sb without yet exceeding the limits} of what I have
called radical reductionism, we may take full statements as our significant
{\sb units}
-- thus demanding that our statements as wholes be {\sb translatable} into
{\sb sense-datum language}, but not that they be translatable term by term.}

\m  
7. {\q This {\sb emendation} would unquestionably have been welcome to Locke
and Hume and Tooke, but historically it had to await an important
reorientation in {\sb semantics} -- the reorientation whereby the primary {\sb
vehicle} of meaning came to be seen no longer in the term but in the
statement. This reorientation, {\sb explicit} in Frege, underlies Russell'a
concept of incomplete symbols defined in use; also it is {\sb implicit} in
the verification theory of meaning, since the objects of verification are
statements.}

\m
8. {\q Radical reductionism, conceived now with statements as units,
sets itself the task of specifying a sense-datum language and showing how to
translate the rest of significant discourse, statement by statement, into
it. Carnap embarked on this project in the {\k Aufbau.}}
\m
9. {\q The language which Carnap {\sb adopted} as his starting point was not
a sense-datum language in the narrowest {\sb conceivable} sense, for it {\sb
included} also the notations of logic, up through higher {\sb set theory}. In
effect it included the whole language of pure mathematics. The ontology
implicit in it (i.e., the range of values of its variables) embraced not
only sensory events but classes, classes of classes, and so on. Empiricists
there are who would boggle at such prodigality. Carnap's starting point is
very parsimonious, however, in its extralogical or sensory part. In a series
of constructions in which he exploits the resources of modern logic with
much ingenuity, Carnap succeeds in defining a wide array of important
additional sensory concepts which, but for his constructions, one would not
have dreamed were definable on so slender a basis. Carnap was the first
empiricist who, not content with asserting the reducibility of science to
terms of immediate experience, took serious steps toward carrying out the
reduction.}

\m
10. {\q    Even supposing Carnap's starting point satisfactory, his
constructions were, as he himself stressed, only a fragment of the full
program. The construction of even the simplest statements about the physical
world was left in a sketchy state. Carnap's suggestions on this subject
were, despite their sketchiness, very suggestive. He explained
spatio-temporal point-instants as quadruples of real numbers and envisaged
assignment of sense qualities to point-instants according to certain canons.
Roughly summarized, the plan was that qualities should be assigned to
point-instants in such a way as to achieve the laziest world compatible with
our experience. The principle of least action was to be our guide in
constructing a world from experience.}

\m
{\q
11. Carnap did not seem to recognize, however, that his treatment of
physical objects fell short of reduction not merely through sketchiness, but
in principle. Statements of the form 'Quality q is at point-instant x; y; z;
t' were, according to his canons, to be apportioned truth values in such a
way as to maximize and minimize certain over-all features, and with growth
of experience the truth values were to be progressively revised in the same
spirit. I think this is a good schematization (deliberately oversimplified,
to be sure) of what science really does; but it provides no indication, not
even the sketchiest, of how a statement of the form 'Quality q is at x; y;
z; t' could ever be translated into Carnap's initial language of sense data
and logic. The connective 'is at' remains an added undefined connective; the
canons counsel us in its use but not in its elimination.}
\m
12. {\q Carnap seems to have appreciated this point afterward; for in his
later writings he abandoned all notion of the translatability of statements
about the physical world into statements about immediate experience.
Reductionism in its radical form has long since ceased to figure in Carnap's
philosophy.}

\m
13. {\q  But the dogma of reductionism has, in a subtler and more
tenuous form, {\sb continued} to {\sb influence} the thought of empiricists.
The notion lingers that to each statement, or each synthetic statement,
there is {\sb associated} a {\sb unique} range of possible sensory events
such that the occurrence of any of them would add to the {\sb likelihood} of
truth of the statement, and that there is associated also another unique
range of possible sensory events whose occurrence would {\sb detract} from
that likelihood. This notion is of course implicit in the verification
theory of meaning.}

\m
14. {\q The dogma of reductionism {\sb survives} in the {\sb supposition}
that each statement, taken in isolation from its {\sb fellows}, can {\sb
admit of} confirmation or infirmation at all. My countersuggestion, issuing
essentially from Carnap's doctrine of the physical world in the {\k Aufbau},
is that our statements about the external world {\sb face} the tribunal of
sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body.}
\m
15. {\q The dogma of reductionism, even in its attenuated form, is
intimately connected with the other dogma: that there is a cleavage between
the analytic and the synthetic. We have found ourselves {\sb led}, indeed,
from {\sb the latter} problem to {\sb the former} through the verification
theory of meaning. More directly, the one dogma clearly {\sb supports} the
other in this way: as long as it is taken to be significant in general to
speak of the confirmation and infirmation of a statement, it seems
significant to speak also of a limiting kind of statement which is {\sb
vacuously} confirmed, {\k ipso facto}, come what may; and such a statement
is analytic.}

\m 
16. {\q The two dogmas are, indeed, {\sb at root} identical. We lately
reflected that in general the truth of statements does obviously {\sb
depend} both upon language and upon extra-linguistic fact; and we noted that
this obvious {\sb circumstance} carries in its train, not logically but all
too naturally, a feeling that the truth of a statement is somehow analyzable
into a linguistic {\sb component} and a factual component. The factual
component must, if we are empiricists, boil down to a range of confirmatory
experiences. In {\sb the extreme case} where the linguistic component is all
that {\sb matters}, a true statement is analytic. But I hope we are now {\sb
impressed with} how stubbornly the distinction between analytic and
synthetic has {\sb resisted} any straightforward drawing. I am impressed
also, apart from prefabricated examples of black and white balls in an urn,
with how baffling the problem has always been of {\sb arriving at} any
explicit theory of the empirical confirmation of a synthetic statement. My
present {\sb suggestion} is that it is nonsense, and the root of much
nonsense, to speak of a linguistic component and a factual component in the
truth of any individual statement. Taken collectively, science has its
double {\sb dependence upon} language and experience; but this duality is
not significantly traceable into the statements of science taken one by
one.}

\m
17. {\q The idea of defining a symbol in use was, as remarked, an
{\sb advance over} the impossible term-by-term empiricism of Locke and Hume.
The statement, rather than the term, came with Frege to be {\sb recognized
as} the unit accountable to an empiricist critique. But what I am now {\sb
urging} is that even in taking the statement as unit we have drawn our grid
too finely. The unit of empirical significance is the whole of science.}


\end



 